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Abstract 
At the center of this paper are three questions: in the absence of a religious 
worldview, can one gain access to the concepts of forgiveness and reconcilia-
tion, can reconciliation be achieved in the absence of forgiveness or does the 
former depend in some way upon the latter, and can we make sense of a re-
storative approach to justice in the absence of either forgiveness or reconcili-
ation? To answer these questions, I look closely at the concept of forgiveness 
in the first section of this article with the goals of disentangling it from its re-
ligious undertones and emphasizing its importance to the very concept of re-
storative justice. Drawing on both theoretical work and practical examples, I 
argue that forgiveness is not necessarily a religious concept—contrary to com-
mon perception—and that, contra Zehr, it is a foundational component of re-
storative justice. Having considered this first problem, I turn—in the second 
section—to a discussion of the concept of reconciliation, arguing that personal 
and political reconciliation must be separated from one another and from the 
concept of forgiveness. Ultimately, I conclude that forgiveness and reconcili-
ation are quite different concepts, that the latter relies on the former, and that 
the latter is a goal rather than a necessary component of restorative justice. 
Drawing largely on the work of Hannah Arendt, Susan Dwyer, Trudy Gov-
ier, and Howard Zehr, as well as discussions with members of Murder Vic-
tims’ Families for Reconciliation, I argue that political reconciliation between 
groups can be achieved in the absence of personal reconciliation between in-
dividual victims and perpetrators in those groups. Further, I demonstrate that 
restorative practices open up the possibility of both types of reconciliation, but 
that they are ultimately founded only on the principle of forgiveness. 
Keywords: forgiveness, reconciliation, restorative justice, religion, Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission 
    
The past ten years have seen an unprecedented outpouring of support 
for the idea of restorative justice. Proponents hold a very different view of 
criminal justice from the prevailing understanding of crime and punish-
ment: “If crime harms people, justice should be a search to make things 
right to and between people…. If crime is injury, justice will repair injuries 
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and promote healing. Acts of restoration—not further harm—will coun-
terbalance the harm of crime” (Zehr 2005, p. 186). Thus, as David Cayley 
(1998, p. 10) defines them, restorative practices “seek noncustodial settle-
ments; they allow both the offender and the victim much more initiative; 
they are oriented more to peacemaking than punishment; and they try to 
mobilize the capacities of families, friends, and local communities in cor-
recting offenders and holding them accountable.” In particular, the expe-
riences offered to the world by the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) in the late 1990s suggested that the retributive frame-
work of Western justice systems might be lacking in some important re-
spect. And yet, for all the lip-service paid to forgiveness and reconciliation 
of late, there remains a great deal of misunderstanding about what exactly 
is meant by these terms and by restorative justice.
Howard Zehr explicitly disconnects forgiveness and reconciliation from 
restorative justice. He argues that “forgiveness or reconciliation is not a pri-
mary principle or focus of restorative justice…. There should be no pressure 
to choose to forgive or to seek reconciliation” (Zehr 2002, p. 8). I will say 
much more, below, about the problem with conflating forgiveness and rec-
onciliation, as Zehr does here, but for now it is sufficient to say that the two 
must be separated from one another so that restorative justice is not judged 
a failure when people or communities cannot be reconciled. A careful look 
at the South African experiment is particularly instructive, as Nelson Man-
dela embraced restorative practices while seeking to separate forgiveness 
and two distinct types of reconciliation—personal and political—from one 
another. The former is concerned with restoring a relationship between vic-
tim and offender, while the latter seeks to repair broken trust between hos-
tile groups in the aftermath of international or intrastate conflict. While per-
sonal reconciliation is a desired outcome of a restorative approach to justice, 
it is not required for either the success of restorative practices or the achieve-
ment of political reconciliation. As argued by Marius Schoon, a South Afri-
can whose wife and daughter were killed in 1984 by a letter-bomb intended 
for him, “On the whole I’m in favor of the Truth and Reconciliation Com-
mission. I think it is going to bring about national reconciliation. In my case, 
it’s not going to bring about personal reconciliation” (quoted in Dwyer 1999, 
p. 95). Selecting Desmond Tutu to spearhead the TRC was vitally impor-
tant for South Africa, and also provided a great deal of weight to the uncer-
tain concept of restorative justice; that said, his overt spirituality might well 
have unwittingly merged personal and political reconciliation with one an-
other, with forgiveness, and with restorative justice.1
As Rajeev Bhargava (2000, p. 61) notes, “Victims in South Africa have 
complained bitterly that the justification of forgiveness derives from a par-
ticular moral vision with which they do not identify and that therefore it 
is not incumbent upon them to heed the plea to forgive.” To answer this 
critique, I look closely at the concept of forgiveness in the first section of 
this article with the goals of disentangling it from its religious undertones 
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and emphasizing its importance to the very concept of restorative justice. 
Drawing on both theoretical work and practical examples, I argue that for-
giveness is not necessarily a religious concept—contrary to common per-
ception—and that, contra Zehr, it is a foundational component of restor-
ative justice. Having considered this first problem, I turn—in the second 
section—to a discussion of the concept of reconciliation, arguing that per-
sonal and political reconciliation must be separated from one another and 
from the concept of forgiveness. Ultimately, I conclude that forgiveness 
and reconciliation are quite different concepts, that the latter relies on the 
former, and that the latter is a goal rather than a necessary component of 
restorative justice. Drawing largely on the work of Hannah Arendt, Susan 
Dwyer, Trudy Govier, and Howard Zehr, as well as discussions with mem-
bers of Murder Victims’ Families for Reconciliation, I argue that political 
reconciliation between groups can be achieved in the absence of personal 
reconciliation between individual victims and perpetrators in those groups. 
Further, I demonstrate that restorative practices open up the possibility of 
both types of reconciliation, but that they are ultimately founded only on 
the principle of forgiveness.
The Role of Forgiveness in Restorative Justice 
  
In thinking through the connection between forgiveness and restorative 
justice, it is of paramount importance to begin with the victims. Restorative 
justice, after all, seeks to address the needs of victims in a very different 
manner from our current criminal justice system. As Zehr (2002, p. 14) ar-
gues, “Victims often feel ignored, neglected, or even abused by the justice 
process.” These feelings seem to stem directly from the fact that our sys-
tem is an adversarial one, in which the state stands in for crime victims at 
trial and offenders are encouraged to keep details to themselves in an effort 
to avoid self-incrimination. In the end, the criminal justice process equates 
the punishment that is meted out to offenders with meeting the needs of 
victims. Quite at odds with this conception, however, are some additional 
needs of victims, namely for information, truth-telling, empowerment, and 
restitution, that often go unnoticed or are ignored (cf. Zehr 2002, pp. 13-15). 
While each of these is a benefit gained by victims from restorative justice 
practices, I will focus primarily on the third—empowerment—in what fol-
lows because its connection with forgiveness is most explicit. It is through 
the experience of forgiving offenders that victims are empowered and can 
gain access to all that a restorative process offers.
Briefly, though, it is clear that victims and their loved ones have a deep 
desire for answers and, more often than not, criminal trials cannot address 
it: “They need real information, not speculation or the legally constrained 
information that comes from a trial or plea agreement” (Zehr 2002, p. 14). 
Victims frequently want a reason that explains why they were targeted 
and, while there often is no such reason, they can benefit a great deal from 
A. Ko h en i n Cr i t.  rev. int l.  So C i a l a nd Pol i ti C a l Phi l o S. 12 (2009)402
learning that their actions had nothing to do with their victimization. In 
the case of grave violations of human rights, as in South Africa, many vic-
tims’ families wanted to know where the remains of their loved ones could 
be found for proper burial; the TRC found itself exhuming bodies and pre-
siding over funerals on a number of occasions, two activities that no one 
considered when the Commission began its work. In addition to the need 
for information, the experience of telling the story of one’s victimization 
can be transformative. As Martha Minow (2000, p. 243) notes, “the trauma 
story is transformed as testimony from a telling about shame and humilia-
tion to a portrayal of dignity and virtue; by speaking of trauma, survivors 
regain lost worlds and lost selves.” Further, restitution is important—not 
simply because some actual losses might be recouped, but because it im-
plies an acknowledgement of the wrong in a way that a guilty verdict does 
not; a great majority of convicted offenders continue to maintain their inno-
cence—often implausibly and indefinitely—but, “When an offender makes 
an effort to make right the harm, even if only partially, it is a way of saying 
‘I am taking responsibility, and you are not to blame’“ (Zehr 2002, p. 15).2
With regard to the concept of forgiveness, however, some unpacking is 
required, for it isn’t immediately clear how empowerment is as explicitly 
connected to forgiving as I have suggested. On first blush, it seems odd to 
equate either justice or empowerment with forgiveness; the mistake, how-
ever, lies in the contemporary understanding of forgiveness, where an of-
fender apologizes and a victim accepts that apology. This sort of forgive-
ness takes its bearings from biblical accounts, especially the famous parable 
of the unmerciful servant in the Gospel of Matthew (18: 21-22), which be-
gins with Peter asking, “’Lord, how many times shall I forgive my brother 
when he sins against me? Up to seven times?’ Jesus answered, ‘I tell you, 
not seven times, but seventy times seven.’“3 Fred Luskin (2003, p. 68), di-
rector of the Stanford University Forgiveness Project, points out the prob-
lem cogently: 
Some of us confuse forgiveness with condoning unkind actions. There are 
those who think that we forgive in order to repair the relationship with 
the offender. Some of us are afraid to forgive because we think we will not 
be able to seek justice. Some think that forgiveness has to be a precursor 
to reconciliation. Some of us think that forgiveness means we forget what 
happened. Others of us think that because our religion says we should for-
give we have to be able to. Each of these conceptions is wrong.
If these common understandings are wrong, though, Luskin is decidedly 
more evasive when it comes to formulating his own. Indeed, definitions 
of forgiveness tend to vacillate between relying on religion and being hard 
to decipher. Rodney L. Petersen (2002, p. 14), for example, presents a the-
ology of forgiveness that can be found in Jesus’ teaching: “First, forgive-
ness is the free and sovereign gift of a loving God as revealed in a rela-
tionship best described as a covenant. Second, the chief instrument for the 
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realization of forgiveness is the sacrificial cult that Jesus was understood 
to personify. Finally, a realization of repentance grows out of the release of 
forgiveness.” Others, like Luskin (2003, p. 68), steer clear of the New Tes-
tament, but their accounts of forgiveness remain imprecise and difficult 
to access: “Forgiveness,” he says, “is the experience of peacefulness in the 
present moment.”4 Luskin is not alone, of course, in attempting to explain 
the transformative power of forgiveness, nor is he alone in his definitional 
troubles. Tutu (2000, p. 271), for example, argues that forgiveness “means 
taking what happened seriously and not minimizing it; drawing out the 
sting in the memory that threatens to poison our entire existence.” Why 
exactly one might tie forgiveness to empowerment and healing—let alone 
how—is left up to each individual.
For some assistance with definitions, a brief look at the Oxford Eng-
lish Dictionary is instructive. There are eight definitions listed for “for-
give” and they range from the very obscure (“to give up one’s resolve”) 
to the more recognizable (“To give up resentment against, pardon [an of-
fender]”) (Simpson & Weiner 2003, vol. 6, pp. 71-72). The first uses of the 
word in English are found in a translation of the Gospel of Matthew (c. 
1000), but only one definition—where forgiveness is equated with absolu-
tion—can be easily connected to religion (Simpson & Weiner 2003, vol. 6, 
pp. 71-72). Forgiveness is one of the more well-known attributes of God 
in the New Testament, certainly, but the connection between forgiveness 
and religion (particularly Christianity) is not a necessary one. Hannah Ar-
endt (1998, p. 238) makes this point, while at the same time embracing Je-
sus as an exemplar of the power of forgiveness: “The discoverer of the 
role of forgiveness in the realm of human affairs was Jesus of Nazareth. 
The fact that he made this discovery in a religious context and articu-
lated it in religious language is no reason to take it any less seriously in a 
strictly secular sense.”5 Indeed, the most common uses of the word—from 
the OED—do not involve a deity at all, focusing instead on the interac-
tions between victim and offender.6 According to Zehr (2005, p. 47), “For-
giveness is letting go of the power the offense and the offender have over 
a person. It means no longer letting that offense and offender dominate. 
Without this experience of forgiveness, without this closure, the wound 
festers, the violation takes over our consciousness, our lives. It, and the 
offender, are in control. Real forgiveness, then, is an act of empowerment 
and healing. It allows one to move from victim to survivor.” Addition-
ally, rather than the understanding of forgiveness to which many add the 
concept of forgetting, Trudy Govier (2002, p. 61) argues that “The mem-
ories that accompany forgiveness will be memories that exclude resent-
ment and allow us to “let go” while retaining the knowledge that these 
things were done, and they were wrong.” Unlike the definitions of Pe-
tersen, Luskin, and Tutu, quoted above, the definitions of both Zehr and 
Govier clearly build on the understanding gleaned from the Oxford Eng-
lish Dictionary by focusing on the victim’s choice to let go of resentment 
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toward the offender; in doing so, I want to argue that Zehr and Govier ac-
curately describe the connection between forgiveness and empowerment, 
and provide a connection between forgiveness and restorative justice—
and they do so, here, without reference to religion. If victims are unwill-
ing or unable to begin the process of forgiving offenders, a restorative ap-
proach to justice—with its emphasis on “noncustodial settlements” and 
“peacemaking [rather] than punishment” (Cayley 1998, p. 10)—will likely 
be seen as benefiting offenders at the expense of victims, hardly seeming 
like justice at all.
In the aftermath of any sort of violation, victims typically have the 
feeling that they have lost some element of control over their lives. They 
feel disempowered by offenders, as Zehr (2005, p. 52) notes: “Denial of 
victims’ autonomy by offenders is in large part what makes being a vic-
tim so traumatic. To be whole, we need some sense of being in control 
of our own lives and destinies. To have that taken away suddenly, arbi-
trarily, frighteningly, is intensely dehumanizing. Offenders turn victims 
into objects, into “things,” robbing them of power over their own lives.” 
If Zehr is right about this—and I think he undoubtedly is—then one of 
the most powerful aspects of forgiveness is that it allows victims to re-
assert their power over their own lives. In this sense, the experience of 
restorative justice—with its emphasis on forgiving, letting go of the of-
fense—offers victims the possibility of both healing and empowerment. 
In order to gain access to these positive possible outcomes of restorative 
justice, victims must choose to begin the difficult work of forgiving of-
fenders for the harm they caused. Minow points out that there is much 
to be gained from making the choice to forgive; indeed, the very act of 
choosing can itself be empowering for victims. Forgiveness, on this read-
ing, offers a way out of the deep anger and resentment that victims feel 
toward those who have harmed them; it might also be seen as “a way to 
choose to be different from those perpetrators, to embrace a different set 
of values” (Minow 1998, p. 16).
This difficult, but ultimately empowering, work of forgiving need not in-
volve the offender in any way. Govier (2002, p. 62) notes that “If we presume 
that repentance by the offender is a condition of forgiveness by the victim, 
the consequence for forgiveness is a certain incompleteness.” Offenders sel-
dom apologize for their actions or take any responsibility for the harms they 
have caused, and the criminal justice system is often complicit in this lack of 
accountability, as will be discussed in greater detail below (cf. Zehr 2005, pp. 
40-43). But importantly, victims can choose to forgive in the absence of re-
morse or apology from those who have harmed them. On this point, Marga-
ret Holmgren says, “[T]he appropriateness of forgiveness has nothing to do 
with the actions, attitudes, or position of the wrongdoer. Instead it depends 
on the internal preparation of the person who forgives” (quoted in Govier 
2002, p. 62). In order to forgive, victims must allow themselves time to ex-
perience the full range of emotions that come from victimization before em-
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barking on the journey to forgiveness and healing. In doing so, victims can 
recover their sense of both self-worth and autonomy. This unilateral forgive-
ness “does not mean that she should downplay the seriousness of the harm 
done to her, or excuse or condone the wrongdoing. But no victim will bene-
fit, psychologically or morally from clinging to a resentful sense of her own 
victimhood and dwelling on the past” (Govier 2002, p. 63). Perhaps the most 
recognizable contemporary example of unilateral forgiveness is Nelson Man-
dela, who seems to harbor no resentment toward those who imprisoned him 
on Robben Island for 27 years. Govier (2002, p. 71) argues that 
When Mandela reached out to his former enemies and did whatever he 
could to assure them that they would suffer no evil at his hands, he did 
not do this in response to acknowledgement and expressions of remorse 
on the part of white leaders. Nor was he responding to a community that 
had apologized for the wrongs of the past and indicated a commitment to 
deep and widespread moral transformation.
It is undoubtedly because Mandela had so much about which he could 
have been justifiably angry that his forgiveness has inspired so many in 
South Africa and around the world. The unilateral forgiveness that he of-
fered to white South Africans was not seen by anyone as a sign of weakness 
or willingness to forget the past, but instead has gained him nearly univer-
sal admiration for his “openness, acceptance, and lack of bitterness” (Gov-
ier 2002, p. 71). Indeed, Mandela’s decision to spend New Year’s Eve 2000 
on Robben Island signified both his remembering of apartheid and his tri-
umph over the conditions that system imposed on him and all black South 
Africans. Govier (p. 61) rightly argues that “What is at issue in forgiveness 
is not whether suffering and wrongdoing are remembered, but how they 
are remembered.”
But not all victims can be like Mandela, especially as most are also dis-
empowered on another level; the retributive criminal justice system, as it is 
currently constituted, wrests a great deal of control over the situation from 
them. The ability to work toward forgiveness is considerably complicated 
by the fact that “crime is defined as an offense against the state. The state, 
not the individual, is defined as victim. The state—and only the state—
may respond…. Since the state is defined as victim, it is not surprising that 
victims are so consistently left out of the process and that their needs and 
wishes are so little heeded” (Zehr 2005, pp. 81-82). There are an astounding 
number of stories that speak to this point, but an especially powerful ex-
ample is the case of SueZann Bosler, whose father—Reverend Bill Bosler—
was murdered in 1986 (cf. King 2003, pp. 138-162).7 Wounded in the same 
attack, SueZann was called repeatedly as a witness in the penalty phase of 
the state’s capital murder trials of James Bernard Campbell. Like her father, 
SueZann opposed the death penalty and sought to honor her father’s op-
position with her testimony: 
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The judge interrupted her, saying, “There will be no discussion about the 
death penalty, period, and I’m advising you right now that if you vio-
late my order, you will be in direct criminal contempt, and you face six 
months in county jail and a $500 fine.” A videotape of this scene in the 
courtroom shows SueZann Bosler on the witness stand, crying as she re-
plies, “I don’t know what to say. I feel like if I say one word I’m going to 
go to jail. I don’t want to go to jail. That’s not my purpose here.” (Cushing 
& Sheffer 2002, pp. 14-15)
Despite this ordeal, the story has a more positive ending that centers 
around SueZann’s experience of empowerment; in the end, Campbell was 
sentenced to life imprisonment and she was able to attain some measure of 
healing through her work with organizations that are founded on restor-
ative principles and that focus on healing rather than retribution.
When she speaks about forgiveness and healing, Bosler always points 
out that she felt her religious faith called her to forgive Campbell. Of the first 
five and a half years, from her father’s death until Campbell’s second trial 
Bosler (personal communication, August 2, 2006) says, “when I was asked 
repeatedly, ‘Do you forgive him?’ I quickly replied, ‘yes.’ But, as you know, 
I really did not mean it.” What many of her visitors, well-wishers, and even 
family members failed to recognize is that forgiveness is a lengthy process. 
Despite her own good intentions and the feeling that she ought to be for-
giving, Bosler continued to harbor a great deal of anger and hatred. Gov-
ier (2002, p. 43) notes that “Forgiveness is a matter of working over, amend-
ing, and overcoming attitudes, and it is a process, not an event. To say ‘I 
forgive you’ is not necessarily to forgive.” As time passed, SueZann came to 
realize that “when I hated James it damaged me, not him whatsoever. My 
hate and anger toward him did not help me with my father’s memory, it 
tainted it” (personal communication, August 2, 2006). This understanding, 
earned over a period of years that she calls “a lifetime of education and ex-
perience” (personal communication, August 2, 2006), enabled her to achieve 
a far more positive result at Campbell’s second trial than at his first: “When 
I got on the stand…I said, ‘Mr Campbell, I forgive you. Whether you accept 
it or not, I forgive you.’ This time I really meant it. … It’s not like I lied when 
I said I forgave him before. I was just beginning the process; I didn’t realize 
how far I still had to go. After the second trial, I felt so lighthearted. After all 
those miserable years of wanting to feel better, the healing was finally com-
ing true” (King 2003, p. 152). She argues that her ability to heal didn’t stem 
from Campbell’s conviction and punishment; instead, Bosler (personal com-
munication, 17 Jan. 2006) emphasizes her decision to forgive him: “Being 
able to point to him at that moment, and express my forgiveness, was like 
having a weight lifted from my shoulders.” This experience of forgiveness is 
a central tenet of restorative justice; as Zehr (2005, pp. 186-187) argues, “The 
violated should again begin to feel like life makes some sense and that they 
are safe and in control. The violator should be encouraged to change. He or 
she should receive freedom to begin life anew.”
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Unpacking the Concept of Reconciliation 
  
Of course, forgiveness does not come easily or quickly. Even SueZann 
Bosler (personal communication, August 2, 2006), who describes forgiving 
Campbell as giving her power, emphasizes that “I still cry and still have 
moments of up and down.” This is true of even the smallest offenses, as 
anyone who grew up with siblings knows, so forgiving grave offenses be-
comes almost unimaginable. Harder still, and for multiple reasons, would 
be achieving a reconciliation of victim and offender. Most obviously, recon-
ciliation implies a repairing or rebuilding of some sort of relationship but, 
in many cases, none existed prior to the offense or neither party desires 
a relationship. In addition, this personal reconciliation requires interaction 
between victims and offenders, and such interaction is typically discour-
aged by the criminal justice system. Next, it requires that the offender ac-
cept responsibility for the harm he or she has done, which—in our retribu-
tive system—is seldom achieved. A fourth important component involves 
repentance on the part of the offender, for it would be incredibly difficult 
for a victim to reconcile with an unapologetic offender. And finally, I want 
to argue, the victim’s desire for reconciliation necessitates some sort of reli-
gious worldview. In each of these five points, reconciliation stands in sharp 
contrast with forgiveness despite the frequent conflating of the two terms.8
Personal Reconciliation 
  
Clearly, in order for two people to be reconciled there must be a breach 
that is subsequently repaired. While the breach is obvious in most cases—
whether the harm is theft, assault, or even murder—it is also often true that 
the victim and offender do not have a preexisting relationship. Frequently, 
the victim is targeted by the offender at random and restorative justice can 
help the victim recognize that he or she was in no way at fault for the harm 
that occurred. Zehr (2005, p. 27) argues that “Information can be very im-
portant to victims, and answers to such questions [as What actually hap-
pened? Why did it happen to me?] may provide an entrance on the road 
to recovery.” While providing these sorts of answers is important to the 
healing process, it is quite different from reconciliation. In cases where vic-
tim and offender have only the crime in common, reconciliation seems a 
very lofty goal, not simply because there is no prior relationship to reestab-
lish. For although Zehr (2005, pp. 181-182) argues that the crime itself es-
tablishes a relationship, reconciliation would seem to necessitate that the 
victim has some desire for the continuation of a relationship created by an 
offense.9 Even in those cases where the two have an established relation-
ship that has been breached, personal reconciliation remains difficult un-
der the current criminal justice system, which seeks to establish guilt and 
punish offenders rather than to repair the breach. As Zehr (2005, pp. 79-82) 
points out, 
A. Ko h en i n Cr i t.  rev. int l.  So C i a l a nd Pol i ti C a l Phi l o S. 12 (2009)408
The justice process … requires dependence upon proxy professionals who 
represent offender and the state. This, in turn, removes the process of jus-
tice from the individuals and the communities which are affected. Victim 
and offender become bystanders, nonparticipants in their own cases…. 
The justice process does not seek reconciliation between victim and of-
fender because the relationship between victim and offender is not seen as 
an important problem.
With this in mind, it is also unsurprising that there are often rules prohib-
iting any contact between victims and offenders. These rules exist in or-
der to protect victims from further harm, of course, but they foreclose any 
hope for personal reconciliation at the same time. Because the victim and 
the offender are discouraged or prevented from interacting with one an-
other, stereotypes are maintained on both sides, offenders need not take re-
sponsibility for the harm they have done, and victims cannot gain access to 
information that only offenders can provide.
Since personal reconciliation is a goal—though not a necessity—of re-
storative justice efforts, interaction between the victim and offender is im-
perative. Indeed, the Victim Offender Reconciliation Programs (VORP) 
in North America focus primarily on bringing victims and offenders to-
gether to engage in meaningful dialogue. These programs were pioneered 
by Mennonite communities in Ontario and Indiana, and involve “a face-to-
face encounter between victim and offender in cases which have entered 
the criminal justice system process and the offender has admitted the of-
fense” (Zehr 2005, pp. 160-161). In this way, VORP works in conjunction 
with the criminal justice system, but seeks a very different end. Rather than 
focusing on guilt and punishment, VORP emphasizes “three elements: 
facts, feelings, and agreements” (Zehr 2005, p. 161). The key to the process 
is that both the victim and offender are able to tell their stories and reach 
an agreement together about how the wrong can be made right. As Zehr 
(p. 162) points out, “VORP provides opportunity for expression of feelings, 
exchange of information, and recovery of losses while leaving victims with 
a sense of empowerment.” Benefits also accrue to the offenders, especially 
in putting a face to the harm they have caused and accepting responsibility 
for their actions. Further, since “they are real participants rather than by-
standers, they too can experience empowerment” (Zehr 2005, p. 162). The 
trouble, of course, is that the VORP model is atypical; more often than not, 
the offender does not express remorse or even admit the offense. In our 
criminal justice system, police officers must advise suspected criminals that 
anything they say can be used against them in court and defense attorneys 
routinely advise their clients not to testify at trial. While this is often an ef-
fective strategy when it comes to the adversarial criminal trial—making the 
most of the presumption of innocence—it does little to help the offender 
take responsibility for his actions. Indeed, it promotes the impression that 
justice is something that is done to the offender, rather than a process in 
which he or she actively participates.
Fo r g i v en es s A n d rec o n c i li A ti o n i n res to r A ti v e Jus ti c e 409
Further, the VORP model is typically used to resolve relatively non-vi-
olent crimes like theft, vandalism, and burglary. Putting it into practice in 
murder cases might seem to be setting the idea of personal reconciliation up 
for failure.10 That said, the process is increasingly being introduced in cases 
where harms more serious than burglary have been committed, and the re-
sults are encouraging.11 The reason for these positive results, I want to argue, 
has nearly everything to do with the victims of violence and their outlook. In-
deed, in those cases where reconciliation has been achieved the victims have 
been particularly extraordinary individuals; they have both forgiven the of-
fense and then sought to establish a connection with the offenders, whether 
or not a prior relationship existed. Consider the following two examples, one 
from the United States and the other from South Africa.
The first case involves Bill Pelke, a retired steelworker from Indiana. 
In 1986, Pelke’s grandmother Ruth was brutally murdered by four teen-
age girls from a local high school in Gary, Indiana (cf. King 2003, pp. 87-
114). The ringleader, 15-year-old Paula Cooper, was sentenced to death 
and Pelke was supportive of that decision. Years later, Pelke says he “went 
through a spiritual transformation … after praying for love and compas-
sion for Paula Cooper and her family. He became involved in an interna-
tional crusade on Paula’s behalf and in 1999 after over two million people 
from Italy signed petitions and Pope John Paul II’s request for mercy, Paula 
was taken off of death row and her sentence commuted to 60 years” (Pelke 
2005). Since then, Pelke has worked to establish a relationship with Cooper; 
they exchange letters regularly and he has visited her in prison on a num-
ber of occasions. In speaking about why he chose to reconcile with Coo-
per, Pelke (personal communication, August 5, 2005) says, “I thought my 
grandmother would want me to share some things with her from the Bible. 
Nana let Paula into her home so she could teach her Bible lessons. Since 
Nana could no longer share that with Paula, I thought I would say some 
things to her that Nana would have wanted me to.”
In South Africa, one of the most well-known cases handled by the TRC 
involved the so-called Guguletu Seven, young men who were killed by po-
lice in 1986. At the time, the seven were labeled as terrorists and the shoot-
out was used by police as an example of their success in keeping order in 
the townships. When two of the policemen—one white, the other black—
appeared before the TRC years later, however, it became clear that the Gu-
guletu Seven had been targeted by police, infiltrated by an informant, and 
led into a trap that resulted in their deaths. Thapelo Mbelo, the black of-
ficer who infiltrated the group, ultimately asked to meet with the moth-
ers of the murdered young men to explain himself, but the mothers were 
initially (understandably) unforgiving. Then, one of the mothers—Cynthia 
Ngewu—made the decision to tell Mbelo that she would forgive him, tak-
ing her cue from the example of Jesus, and the others also seemed to soften 
their attitude toward him. Minow (1998, p. 82) offers Ngewu’s own words 
about her decision to reconcile: “This thing called reconciliation … if I am 
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understanding it correctly … if it means this perpetrator, this man who has 
killed Christopher Piet, if it means he becomes human again, this man, so 
that I, so that we all of us, get our humanity back … then I agree, then I 
support it all.”12
The determining factor in both of these examples—and in countless oth-
ers I have not recounted—is the role played by religious faith. As I argued 
above, there are myriad reasons for victims to forgive (including religious 
faith, of course), but, if reconciliation between victim and offender is going 
to occur, a religious understanding of the world and humanity’s place in 
it must play a major role. For in reconciling, victims are asked to do more 
than forgive; they are brought (back) together with offenders so that some 
sort of relationship can be (re)established in the aftermath of some (of-
ten terrible) breach. Why might victims want to reconcile with those who 
have done them such harm? While there are many non-religious reasons 
to forgive—as described above—it is a very difficult task to imagine sim-
ilar motivating circumstances for reconciliation, precisely because recon-
ciliation requires so much more of victims. I want to argue that the moti-
vating force—for religious people—is the sense that reconciliation is part 
of God’s plan.13 As Michael J. Perry (1998, pp. 14-15) argues, the central 
feature of a religious worldview is “a vision of final and radical reconcil-
iation, a set of beliefs about how one is or can be bound or connected to 
the world—to the “other” and to “nature”—and, above all, to Ultimate Re-
ality in a profoundly intimate way.”14 Indeed, each one of the four defi-
nitions of reconciliation in the Oxford English Dictionary make reference to 
God or religion, including “The action of reconciling persons spec. in reli-
gious use, of God and man” and “The purification, or restoration to sacred 
uses, of a church, etc., after desecration or pollution” (Simpson & Weiner 
2003, vol. 13, p. 354).15 The concept has lost some of its religious meaning 
over time, so that many people now speak of reconciliation—incorrectly, I 
want to argue—when two parties are restored to friendly relations or when 
two warring groups begin to live together without murdering one another. 
As Govier (2002, p. 143) states, “To be worthy of the name, reconciliation 
must involve more than non-violent co-existence.” But the earliest English 
uses of the word all involve religion; typically they involve uniting all of 
humanity with God or individuals with the church. For example, in 1382, 
Wyclif writes, “God was in Crist, reconcilynge to him the world”; in 1387, 
Trevisa notes that “þe pope Iustinus reconcilede þe bisshoppes þat Anasta-
cius hadde exciled”; and around 1386, Chaucer asserts that “If the chirche 
be halewed … the chirche is entredited til it be reconciled by the bysshope” 
(Simpson & Weiner 2003, vol. 13, pp. 352-353). These explicit connections 
between religion and reconciliation, I want to argue, provide one of the 
clearest distinctions between that concept and the concept of forgiveness.
Personal reconciliation, then, sets a very high bar, as the offender must 
take responsibility for the harm he or she has caused and then express re-
morse to the victim. This is a marked difference from the concept of for-
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giveness, as a victim can choose to forgive without any contrition on the 
part of the offender; beginning the process of reconciling with such an un-
sympathetic offender, however, would be nearly impossible. Interestingly, 
remorse was not a condition for amnesty in South Africa, but offenders 
were required to make “a full disclosure relating to the crime for which 
amnesty was being sought” (Tutu 2000, p. 30). The requirement of truth 
as a condition for amnesty, as every proponent of the TRC notes, arose in 
part because the process was an imperfect one that arose out of a stale-
mate between the minority government and the forces of democracy. But, 
as Tutu (2000, p. 49) rightly asks, “Could it ever be sufficient for a perpe-
trator, someone who had committed some of the most dastardly and grue-
some atrocities, to be allowed to get off scot-free as it were with only a 
confession, a full disclosure, since, as it happens, the act under which we 
operated did not require that the applicant should express contrition or re-
morse?” In the end, he has multiple answers to this troubling question—
that restorative justice provided a new way of conceiving of the appropri-
ate result as communal healing or that offenders were properly punished 
in the court of public opinion (Tutu 2000, pp. 51, 54-55)16—but it remains 
unclear whether the TRC actually accomplished much in the way of per-
sonal reconciliation.17
As noted above, some offenders were apologetic and the process of rec-
onciliation with victims could begin. Other offenders, however, were vo-
cally unapologetic and this made reconciliation, especially with individ-
ual victims, seem not to be an option at all. Consider, for example, the case 
of Jacques Hechter, a police captain who murdered dozens of people and 
then read an unconvincing prepared statement of remorse at his amnesty 
hearing. Confronted afterward by David Goodman, a reporter covering 
the TRC, Hechter responded to an accusation that his statement sounded 
wooden and disingenuous; according to Goodman (1999, p. 176): 
Hechter wheels around and glares at me. “Ach, I’m not fuckin’ sorry for 
what I did,” he says defiantly, his mouth cocked in a macabre half-smile. 
He stares directly at me, as if his stare could freeze me in place. “Look—I 
fought for my country, I believed in what I did, and I did a good job. They 
were my enemy at the time … I did my job well. And I’d do it again if the 
circumstances called for it.”
Faced with an offender of this sort, it is clear to see why many victims felt 
that the TRC worked for the offenders more than it did for them. But per-
sonal reconciliation should not be understood as the central focus of the 
TRC and is not the basis on which its success should be measured.
Political Reconciliation 
  
Most efforts at restorative justice that existed prior to the very public 
South African experiment were much smaller and more local. While per-
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sonal reconciliation often took place in those instances, it was left up to 
the participants themselves to make that choice. By contrast, the TRC was 
tasked with the daunting project of promoting “national unity and recon-
ciliation in a spirit of understanding which transcends the conflicts and di-
visions of the past” (South African Constitution 1995). The goal, then, was 
political reconciliation, a very different outcome from the personal reconcil-
iation that might be achieved by the VORP process described above. “The 
act establishing the TRC described South Africa as a nation with “a legacy 
of hatred, fear, guilt, and revenge” which was attempting to “transcend the 
divisions and strife of the past.” To speak of transcending divisions indi-
cates a perceived need to deal with attitudes and feelings; such language sug-
gests a conception of reconciliation richer than that of non-violent co-ex-
istence” (Govier 2002, p. 144). And to attempt that task, in the immediate 
aftermath of apartheid, Archbishop Desmond Tutu was selected to lead the 
TRC forward.
Of course, many South Africans do not see eye to eye with Tutu on the 
virtues of giving amnesty to perpetrators of horrific crimes in exchange for 
the truth about those crimes. This is especially true of those who do not 
share Tutu’s religious beliefs and who cannot see any connection between 
their own understandings of justice and the efforts of the TRC. Churchill 
Mxenge—whose brother, Griffiths, was murdered because of his work as 
an antiapartheid lawyer and whose family challenged the amnesty process 
in court—makes precisely this point: “I try to put myself in Tutu’s position 
… Tutu is a man of the cloth, a man who believes in miracles. But I cannot 
see him being able overnight to cause people who are hurt and bleeding to 
simply forget about their wounds and forget about justice. … Unless justice 
is done it’s difficult for any person to think of forgiving” (quoted in Minow 
1998, p. 81). Tutu’s response, directly to Mxenge and also more generally 
in his book, is an appeal to restorative justice that, he argues, is particularly 
important in South Africa. First, as noted above, he highlights the point 
that the offer of amnesty to perpetrators resulted from political necessity. 
Secondly, though, Tutu (2000, pp. 54-55) argues that 
there is another kind of justice, restorative justice, which was characteris-
tic of traditional African jurisprudence. Here the central concern is not ret-
ribution or punishment. In the spirit of ubuntu, the central concern is the 
healing of breaches, the redressing of imbalances, the restoration of bro-
ken relationships, a seeking to rehabilitate both the victim and the per-
petrator, who should be given the opportunity to be reintegrated into the 
community he has injured by his offense.
Tutu is clearly hopeful that people like Mxenge will someday gain access 
to this very different conception of justice and he provides, in this state-
ment, a clear picture of the power of reconciliation. That said, he makes 
a mistake, on my reading, to connect personal and political reconciliation 
here; although he has a strong desire for everyone to build positive rela-
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tionships in the new South Africa, Tutu will likely never convince Mxenge 
to reconcile with those who murdered his brother. However, this has little 
bearing on whether he can gain access to the concept of restorative justice 
or whether black and white South Africans, as distinct groups, can be rec-
onciled in the aftermath of apartheid. Rather than appealing to the concept 
of ubuntu and seeking to demonstrate that restorative justice is consistent 
with a traditional African understanding of justice, Tutu might do better by 
showing that Mxenge is incorrect about forgiveness necessitating both re-
ligious belief and forgetting the offense. Rather than an abstraction that in-
volves spirituality and forgetfulness, forgiveness should instead be thought 
of as a concrete political choice of release for the offender and empower-
ment for the victim. Following Arendt (1998, p. 240), then, Tutu might ar-
gue that “Only through this constant mutual release from what they do can 
men remain free agents, only by constant willingness to change their minds 
and start again can they be trusted with so great a power as that to begin 
something new.” In this way he might encourage the healing process for 
these victims (and victims’ families) and give them easier access to the con-
cept of restorative justice, while also fostering the political reconciliation 
that the TRC seeks. As Govier (2002, p. 144) argues, “In the aftermath of se-
rious conflict, for reconciliation to be lasting, some kind of trust must be 
built, and for that to happen, attitudes must change—hence the relevance 
for forgiveness.”
While the concept of ubuntu might be quite helpful in achieving forgive-
ness, it is not required. As outlined above, forgiveness may be offered uni-
laterally and purely for one’s own good rather than with a view to the good 
of the offender or the nation. Of course, this mistake is not simply Tutu’s. 
The concept of ubuntu is explicitly referenced in the Promotion of National 
Unity and Reconciliation Act in South Africa’s constitution and, as such, it 
receives a good deal of attention from Tutu. Indeed, he claims that the ideas 
represented by the word—which is “very difficult to render into a Western 
language” (Tutu 2000, p. 31)—are central to the African sense of self. He also 
points out that these ideas are quite at odds with the Western concept of in-
dividuality, but that ubuntu “speaks of the very essence of being human” (p. 
31). The idea shares a good deal with Marx’s concept of the species-being—
beyond simply being set in opposition to the Western assumptions about in-
dividuality. To get a better sense of what Tutu (p. 31) has in mind when he 
talks about ubuntu, it is useful to quote him at some length: 
When we want to give high praise to someone we say, “Yu, u nobuntu”; 
“Hey, so-and-so has ubuntu.” Then you are generous, you are hospita-
ble, you are friendly and caring and compassionate. You share what you 
have. It is to say, “My humanity is caught up, is inextricably bound up, in 
yours.”… A person with ubuntu is open and available to others, affirming 
of others, does not feel threatened that others are able and good, for he or 
she has a proper self-assurance that comes from knowing that he or she 
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belongs in a greater whole and is diminished when others are humiliated 
or diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed, or treated as if they 
were less than who they are.
This idea fits nicely with the general theory of restorative justice, 
though the latter in no way necessitates that individuals have ubuntu or 
think about humanity in this way. Further, as Richard A. Wilson (1996, pp. 
11-13) points out, this universalistic concept of ubuntu might be as much a 
recent creation as a return to a tradition of the past and “popular concep-
tions of the term have markedly particularistic connotations.”18 Either way, 
though, the emphasis that Tutu places on ubuntu is interesting because he 
clearly approaches restorative justice through an understanding of recon-
ciliation that is grounded in Christianity instead. Indeed, Tutu’s approach 
to restorative justice seems to rely on personal reconciliation; it is, in my es-
timation, bound up with his own religious worldview but it need not be.
In thinking about political reconciliation, then, Mandela offers a pow-
erful example once again, for his actions after his release from prison were 
clearly undertaken with the express purpose of making a political state-
ment. Necessary for political reconciliation is both a public apology and 
forgiveness, though the order in which those take place is less important 
than it might appear.19 Clearly, Mandela has offered public forgiveness—
and he did so unilaterally. Govier (2002, p. 72) argues that “this forgive-
ness, granted publicly by a leading victim of wrongdoing, was not a purely 
individual and private matter, but rather a unilateral initiative towards 
broader acknowledgement and reconciliation.” And there have been some 
public expressions of remorse from prominent white South Africans, which 
Tutu argues (2002, pp. xi-xii) have incredible power: 
The hall in which we held the hearing was packed to the rafters with peo-
ple either injured on that occasion or people who had lost loved ones. 
The first witness was the head of the Ciskeian Defense Force. It probably 
wasn’t what he said so much as how he said whatever it was that he said, 
but the tension in the room rose … You could feel the anger of the people 
just multiplying. And then we had the next batch of witnesses, four offi-
cers, one white and three black.
They came onto the stage, and the white guy became their spokesperson. 
And he said, “Yes, we gave the orders for the soldiers to open fire.” Ho! 
It was combustible! And then he turned to the audience, this angry au-
dience, seething, and he said, “Please, forgive us. Please accept my col-
leagues back into the community.”
And do you know what that, that angry audience, did? It broke out into 
deafening applause.
Situations like this one were repeated throughout the years that the TRC 
operated in South Africa, and thus political reconciliation between white 
and black South Africans became a possibility.
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However, the largest problem for South Africa is that many black 
South Africans see the majority of their white counterparts as not hold-
ing themselves accountable, especially insofar as they did not participate 
fully in the work of the TRC (cf. Barrow 1998, Tutu 2003). Govier (2002, 
p. 77) correctly points out that “When the South African TRC was hold-
ing its victim hearings, some observers criticized its messages of forgive-
ness and reconciliation on the grounds that whites were not attending the 
hearings and did not seem to acknowledge their complicity and shared 
responsibility for apartheid.” This is true of the average white South Afri-
can, and—more importantly for the concept of political reconciliation and 
thus for the success for the TRC as a whole—it is also true of the National 
Party leadership who brutally enforced apartheid. Consider the differ-
ence between Mandela’s efforts and those of former Prime Ministers F. W. 
de Klerk and P. W. Botha. Govier (2002, p. 69) highlights any number of 
impressive gestures on Mandela’s part, including that, “In his Inaugura-
tion Day speech on 10 May 1994, he said in Afrikaans, wat is verby is verby 
(what is past is past). The black liberation anthem ‘Nkosi Sikelel I Africa’ 
was sung, but so too was the old Afrikaner anthem, ‘Die Stem.’” In con-
trast, when de Klerk came before the TRC, he “isn’t there to look the past 
in the eye. He’s there to minimize the damage and to play on the senti-
ments of his voters…. De Klerk states repeatedly that his whole upbring-
ing, his entire experience of politics, allowed no room for the kinds of 
atrocities now coming to the surface” (Krog 2000, p. 165). Perhaps worse 
still is that Botha flatly refused to cooperate with the National Party sub-
mission prepared by de Klerk, citing old age and illness even in the face 
of repeated accommodations and then subpoenas by Tutu and the TRC 
(cf. Tutu 2000, pp. 244-250). He then proceeded to launch a series of pub-
lic tirades against the TRC: “I will not appear before the Truth Commis-
sion. I don’t perform in circuses… I won’t allow myself to be threatened. 
The Truth Commission is tearing Afrikaners apart… I am not asking for 
amnesty. I never authorized murders. I will not apologize for the fight 
against a Marxist revolutionary onslaught” (quoted in Krog 2000, p. 347). 
Then, facing a contempt of court charge, he continued in the same vein: 
“I told Mandela to his face, yes, I’ve met him three times, I’ve treated him 
like a gentleman in jail, I told him: ‘Anarchy and the forces of commu-
nism and socialism will destroy you….’ I am sick and tired of the hollow 
parrot-cry of ‘Apartheid!’ I’ve said many times that the word ‘Apartheid’ 
means good-neighborliness” (quoted in Krog 2000, p. 353). In the absence 
of any public acknowledgement of wrongdoing by officials who created 
and enforced apartheid policies—and certainly given these attitudes and 
actions of de Klerk and Botha—the difficult work undertaken by Mandela 
and Tutu might very well be wasted. Govier (2002, p. 145) rightly argues 
that “in politics, unilateral forgiveness that remains unilateral will have 
all the force of an extended but unshaken hand.”
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Conclusion 
Clearly, one of the goals of a restorative approach to justice is to make 
conditions for forgiveness and reconciliation more favorable. In South Af-
rica, the goal of the restorative experiment was to promote political recon-
ciliation and Tutu is undoubtedly right when he argues that the TRC was 
successful in this. After all, he routinely points out, the fact that reconcili-
ation has yet to be achieved is no knock against the process that sought to 
promote it. But, even as he recognizes that his task is political reconcilia-
tion, Tutu also stresses the importance of personal reconciliation—even his 
own: “You see, we can’t go to heaven alone. If I arrive there, God will ask 
me: ‘Where is De Klerk? His path crossed yours.’ And he also—God will 
ask him: ‘Where is Tutu?’ So I cried for him, I cried for De Klerk—because 
he spurned the opportunity to become human” (quoted in Krog 2000, p. 
210). While the sentiment is noble, and very much in keeping with both his 
Christian commitments and his understanding of ubuntu, it seems to con-
fuse the issue at hand. Political reconciliation between whites and blacks in 
South Africa does not necessitate the personal reconciliation of victims and 
offenders, though it would certainly not be harmful. What is required, in-
stead, is nicely articulated by Govier (2002, p. 144) when she argues that 
people cannot come together in a lasting way and co-operate as they will 
need to in a jointly run society if they remain angry, vengeful, suspicious, 
and insecure. The need for forgiveness lies in its relevance to two very 
practical aspects of reconciliation: co-operation and sustainability. Institu-
tion-building, economic development, and political processes require that 
people and people work effectively together. To do so, they need to co-oper-
ate and trust each other in significant respects.
In order to achieve political reconciliation of this sort, notable victims must 
be willing to publicly forgive and well-known offenders must publicly 
apologize or accept the proffered forgiveness, thereby acknowledging the 
wrongs they have committed. There is, then, a necessary connection be-
tween forgiveness and reconciliation (both personal and political), in that 
the latter cannot be accomplished without the former. This is quite differ-
ent, however, from asserting the existence of a similar connection between 
reconciliation, on the one hand, and restorative justice, on the other. Man-
dela, Tutu, and the TRC—and, indeed the restorative model of justice it-
self—have not failed by working toward reconciliation—even if that recon-
ciliation is not achieved in the end.
In emphasizing the importance of forgiveness, Tutu has achieved results 
that are amazing to see and has clearly been in the right; restorative prac-
tices cannot properly get underway when victims continue to harbor resent-
ment and a desire for vengeance. For those who have disagreed with the 
TRC on the grounds that it is a public attempt to enforce Tutu’s religious 
beliefs about forgiveness, a successful strategy might involve appealing to 
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the non-religious understanding of forgiveness articulated above. That said, 
I do not want to be read as suggesting that religion has no place in under-
standing forgiveness, reconciliation, or restorative justice. On the contrary, 
it seems quite clear to me that a religious understanding of the world and 
humanity’s place in it provides easy access to a restorative approach to jus-
tice. If I begin from the premise that my religious commitments dictate for-
giveness and reconciliation, then my path toward forgiving and then actu-
ally reconciling with those who do me harm should have fewer obstacles. 
To take an obvious example, people will work diligently to be forgiving if 
they believe that the life of Jesus provides humanity with the truth about 
the best way of life. Of course, this belief system does not make forgiveness 
or personal reconciliation easy to accomplish, but it does provide a compel-
ling reason for doing such difficult work. As I have argued above, however, 
forgiveness is not restricted to those who hold a religious worldview in the 
same way that personal reconciliation seems to be. Because the former con-
cept is a central component of restorative justice and the latter is one of its 
goals, those victims who do not subscribe to a religious worldview or who 
cannot reconcile with offenders should not consider themselves shut out 
of a discussion of restorative justice. As Arendt (1998, pp. 240-241) argues, 
“forgiveness is the exact opposite of vengeance, which acts in the form of re-
acting against an original trespassing … [it] is the only reaction which does 
not merely re-act but acts anew and unexpectedly, unconditioned by the act 
which provoked it and therefore freeing from its consequences both the one 
who forgives and the one who is forgiven.” It is important to forgive, then, 
for one’s own good and in order to embrace the idea of restorative—rather 
than retributive—justice, but it is not necessary to reconcile in order to em-
brace a vision of justice that “emphasizes the humanity of both offenders 
and victims [and] seeks repair of social connections and peace rather than 
retribution against the offenders” (Minow 1998, p. 92).
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Notes 
1. This should not be read as suggesting that restorative justice and religion were at 
odds with—or even very far apart from—one another before Tutu helped to popu-
larize the former by appealing to the language of the latter. Indeed, the restorative 
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justice movement very much has its roots in religious communities. As Zehr (2002, 
p. 11) points out, “The modern field of restorative justice did develop in the 1970s 
from case experiments in several communities with a proportionately sizable Men-
nonite population. Seeking to apply their faith as well as their peace perspective to 
the harsh world of criminal justice, Mennonites and other practitioners … experi-
mented with victim-offender encounters that led to programs in these communities 
and later became models for programs throughout the world.”
2. Zehr (2005, p. 42) adds to this compelling point in a discussion of the benefits that 
restorative justice accrues to the offender: “Genuine accountability … includes an 
opportunity to understand the human consequences of one’s acts, to face up to 
what one has done and to whom one has done it. But real accountability involves 
more. Accountability also involves taking responsibility for the results of one’s be-
havior. Offenders must be allowed and encouraged to help decide what will hap-
pen to make things right, then to take steps to repair the damage.”
3. The passage continues with Jesus’ parable about the king who forgives one of his 
servants’ large debts to him and that same servant who refuses to forgive a much 
smaller debt owed to him by a fellow servant. When news of this comes to the king, 
he summons the unforgiving servant and says, “You wicked servant … I cancelled 
all that debt of yours because you begged me to. Shouldn’t you have had mercy on 
your fellow servant just as I had on you?” The king then demands that the servant 
repay the full debt and sends him to prison until he does so. The lesson, Jesus tells 
Peter, is that “This is how my heavenly Father will treat each of you unless you for-
give your brother from your heart” (Matthew 18: 23-35). A similar message can be 
found in the Gospel of Luke (17: 3-4): “If your brother sins, rebuke him, and if he 
repents, forgive him. If he sins against you seven times in a day, and seven times 
comes back to you and says, “I repent,” forgive him.” Hannah Arendt (1998, p. 240) 
combines the messages of these two passages in her discussion of forgiveness, noting 
that “Crime and willed evil are rare, even rarer perhaps than good deeds; according 
to Jesus, they will be taken care of by God in the Last Judgment, which plays no role 
whatsoever in life on earth, and the Last Judgment is not characterized by forgive-
ness but by just retribution.” That said, she argues that “sin” is an improper transla-
tion from the New Testament Greek in these passages, as “Hamartanein … is indeed 
very well rendered by ‘trespassing’ in so far as it means rather ‘to miss,’ ‘fail and go 
astray,’ than ‘to sin’“ (Arendt 1998, p. 240, note 78). Her argument is predicated on 
this distinction between “sin” and “trespass,” as she holds that “trespassing is an ev-
eryday occurrence which is in the very nature of action’s constant establishment of 
new relationships within a web of relations, and it needs forgiving, dismissing, in or-
der to make it possible for life to go on by constantly releasing men from what they 
have done unknowingly” (Arendt 1998, p. 240). But, with regard to forgiveness, the 
distinction between “sin” and “trespass” might not be so great as Arendt suggests; 
consider the famous example of the adulteress in the Gospel of John (8: 3-11): “The 
teachers of the law and the Pharisees brought in a woman caught in adultery. They 
made her stand before the group and said to Jesus, ‘Teacher, this woman was caught 
in the act of adultery. In the Law Moses commanded us to stone such women. Now 
what do you say?’ They were using this question as a trap, in order to have a basis 
for accusing him. But Jesus bent down and started to write on the ground with his 
finger. When they kept on questioning him, he straightened up and said to them, ‘If 
any one of you is without sin, let him be the first to throw a stone at her.’ Again he 
stooped and wrote on the ground. At this, those who heard began to go away one 
at a time, the older ones first, until only Jesus was left, with the woman still stand-
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ing there. Jesus straightened up and asked her, ‘Woman, where are they? Has no one 
condemned you?’ ‘No one, sir,’ she said. ‘Then neither do I condemn you,’ Jesus de-
clared. ‘Go now and leave your life of sin.’“
4. Interestingly, Susan Dwyer (1999, p. 84) puts forward a similar psychological moti-
vation for personal reconciliation: “A desire for psychological peace might also be 
what motivates the victim of a crime to meet the person who stole treasured ob-
jects from him.” It remains unclear why this meeting should be thought of as yield-
ing reconciliation between victim and offender rather than setting the stage for it, as 
I argue below.
5. In her discussion of Jesus’ teaching about forgiveness, Arendt (1998, p. 239) remains 
faithful to the religious language of the gospel while also stressing the way in which 
that teaching is accessible in a secular context: “It is decisive in our context that Jesus 
maintains against the “scribes and Pharisees” first that it is not true that only God 
has the power to forgive, and second that this power does not derive from God—
as though God, not men, would forgive through the medium of human beings—but 
on the contrary must be mobilized by men toward each other before they can hope 
to be forgiven by God also.” The emphasis here, clearly, is on the human—as op-
posed to divine—power of forgiveness.
6. In addition to the most common definition quoted initially—”To give up resent-
ment against, pardon (an offender)”—two others are, “To give up, cease to harbour 
(resentment, wrath)” and “to give up resentment or claim to requital for, pardon (an 
offense)” (Simpson & Weiner 2003, vol. 6, pp. 71-72).
7. Though it is not a condition for membership, the majority of the members of Mur-
der Victims’ Families for Reconciliation (MVFR) have chosen to forgive the offend-
ers who murdered their loved ones. For more of these stories, cf. Cushing and Shef-
fer (2002); King (2003); the MVFR website ( http://www.mvfr.org ); and for a global 
perspective, the website of Murder Victims’ Families for Human Rights ( http://
www.willsworld.com/~mvfhr/ ).
8. While I agree wholeheartedly with the separation of personal and political reconcili-
ation that Dwyer (1999, p. 96) highlights, and while we agree that “Reconciliation…
is conceptually independent of forgiveness,” it seems to me either that she is wrong 
“that reconciliation might be psychologically possible where forgiveness is not” or 
that her understanding of reconciliation is significantly thinner than mine. Lending 
credence to my argument that Dwyer (1999, p. 96) does not mean what most peo-
ple do when they talk about reconciliation is the definition she sets out, namely that 
“reconciliation is fundamentally a process whose aim is to lessen the sting of a ten-
sion: to make sense of injuries, new beliefs, and attitudes in the overall narrative 
context of a personal or national life.”
9. This is not to say that victims are unable to reconcile themselves to the particular 
event of victimization. I want to argue, though, that this represents an improper 
use of the term, as this sort of reconciliation is in fact an understanding—by the vic-
tim—of his or her inability to change the past. When victims can reach this point of 
acceptance about the past, they are often able to then take the next step toward for-
giveness or reconciliation.
10. This is not the same as saying that restorative justice is set up for failure, as I argue 
in the concluding section of the article that restorative justice does not rely on rec-
onciliation in the same way that it relies on forgiveness. I want to suggest that, in 
some sense, these victim-offender programs are misnamed because they are restor-
ative but do not necessitate reconciliation, as their name might lead one to believe.
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11. Sherman and Strang (2007) consider the effectiveness of restorative justice prac-
tices, especially face-to-face conferencing, for both victims and offenders. They 
make two claims: “The procedural claim is that restorative justice (RJ) is seen by 
victims and offenders as a more humane and respectful way to process crimes than 
conventional justice (CJ). The effectiveness claim is that RJ is better than CJ in pro-
ducing important results that we want from justice: less repeat offending, more 
repair of harm to victims, fewer crimes of vengeance by victims, more reconcilia-
tion and social bonding among families and friends affected by crime, and more of-
fences brought to justice” (p. 13).
12. The same quotation can also be found in Minow (2000, p. 250) and Krog (2000, p. 
109). My discussion of the Guguletu Seven and Ngewu’s decision to reconcile with 
Mbelo is informed by Frances Reid and Deborah Hoffman’s film, Long night’s jour-
ney into day (2000).
13. Consider the example of Ivan Karamazov, who rejects his brother’s religious 
worldview because it necessitates a reconciliation between victim and offender: “I 
do understand how the universe will tremble when all in heaven and under the 
earth merge in one voice of praise, and all that lives and has lived cries out: “Just 
art thou, O Lord, for Thy ways are revealed!” Oh, yes, when the mother and the 
torturer whose hounds tore her son to pieces embrace each other, and all three cry 
out with tears, “Just art thou, O Lord,” then of course the crown of knowledge will 
have come and everything will be explained. But there is the hitch: that is what I 
cannot accept. And while I am on earth, I hasten to take my own measures. You 
see, Alyosha, it may well be that if I live until that moment, or rise again in order to 
see it, I myself will perhaps cry out with all the rest, looking at the mother embrac-
ing her child’s tormentor: “Just art thou, O Lord!” but I do not want to cry out with 
them. While there’s still time, I hasten to defend myself against it, and therefore I 
absolutely renounce all higher harmony” (Dostoevsky 2002, pp. 244-245).
14. For an extended discussion and critique of Perry’s understanding of a religious 
cosmology, see Kohen (2007, pp. 13-37).
15. A fifth definition, one that does not mention religion, was added to the OED in 
2003: “reconciliation commission, a official body charged with the reconciliation 
of feuding parties, esp. one that investigates allegations of political misconduct” 
(Simpson & Weiner 2003, vol. 13, p. 354).
16. Numerous others have also commented on the amnesty provisions. For exam-
ple, Ntsebeza (2000, p. 164) argues that “For amnesty applicants to be prepared to 
run the gauntlet of public dismay, censure, and even ostracism was a heavy price 
to pay. Amnesty was not cheap… For perpetrators, such exposures are their own 
punishment, and thus an element of justice itself.” Consider, also, the point made 
by Kiss (2000, pp. 76-77): “Ashley Forbes was able to confront his torturer, police-
man Jeffrey Benzien, and compel him to “demonstrate” his torture techniques at 
the amnesty hearing. Forbes then asked Benzien, “What kind of a man does this 
to another human being?”…. Some express repugnance that a person like Benzien 
could receive amnesty and be allowed to return to work as a police officer. Oth-
ers point out that the public and private opprobrium experienced by many perpe-
trators amounted to a powerful form of accountability and even punishment. Ben-
zien, for instance, suffered a nervous breakdown, and other amnestied perpetrators 
were shunned by friends, spouses, and families.”
17. Slye (2000, pp. 180-181) makes a compelling point about the South African exper-
iment, lending support to Tutu’s argument that reconciliation had been fostered 
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despite the amnesty quandary: “If accountability contributes to reconciliation, the 
question is how much accountability was there in the South African amnesty pro-
cess? There is no question that the South African amnesty process provided more 
accountability than any other truth commission, not to mention any other amnesty 
… As a calling to account, the amnesty hearings were effective. Through their ap-
plications and participation in public hearings, amnesty applicants accepted (if 
at times defiantly) responsibility for their violations. Although some argued that 
such public acceptance and exposure constituted a degree of punishment similar 
in kind, if not in degree, to what one gets in a criminal trial, one need not look for 
punishment to find accountability.”
18. Alex Boraine, the deputy chairperson of the TRC, has actually argued against the 
use of ubuntu: “It’s a dangerous concept which is drenched in sentimentality. It cre-
ates a facile and superficial understanding of reconciliation” (cited in Wilson 1996, 
p. 12).
19. On this point, I depart from my general agreement with Govier (2002, p. 141), as 
she argues that “reconciliation can exist without forgiveness; people might come 
together and work towards a common goal without taking time to reflect on the 
wrongs of the past.” But the example she provides, of former enemies working to-
gether in the face of some natural disaster, seems to be a far less robust sort of rec-
onciliation than every other type she discusses. Indeed, one might well imagine 
these supposedly reconciled enemies returning to their animosity just as soon as 
the emergency fades, as their reconciliation is based solely on the enemies’ need 
for a collective response. This resumption of hostilities seems far less likely to occur 
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